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Abstract The Norwegian Petroleum Safety Authority (PSA) requires offshore petro-
leum operators on the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS) to perform risk assessments
of impacts (allisions) between passing ships and offshore installations. These risk
assessments provide a basis for defining the allision accidental load that the installation
shall be designed for. Even though the risk of allision is small, the potential conse-
quences can be catastrophic. In a worst-case scenario, an allision may result in the total
loss of an installation. The ageing industry standard allision risk model, COLLIDE,
calculates the risk of impacts between passing (non-field-related) ships and installations
based on Automatic Identification System (AIS) data. Both the COLLIDE risk model
and a new Bayesian allision risk model currently under development are highly
sensitive to variations in vessels’ passing distances, especially close proximity passings.
Allision risk assessments are typically performed during the design and development
phase of an installation, which means that historical AIS data are used Bas is^,
disregarding future changes to the traffic pattern when the new installation is placed
on a location. This article presents an empirical study of one of the most important
variables used to calculate the risk of allision from passing vessels, namely passing
distance. The study shows that merchant vessels alter course to achieve a safe passing
distance to new surface offshore petroleum installations. This indicates that the results
of current allision risk assessments are overly conservative.
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1 Introduction
Operators of offshore petroleum installations on the Norwegian Continental Shelf
(NCS) are required to assess the risk of ship impacts from both field-related ship
activity and (unrelated) passing vessels. Allision risk assessments of passing vessels
typically start with a mapping of the traffic pattern around a proposed location, using
Automatic Identification System (AIS) data for a (recent) 12-month period. Since these
assessments must be completed before commissioning, the AIS data available at the
time of such studies represent the traffic pattern before the physical installation is
actually placed in the field. Hence, the applicability and validity of these data and their
impact on the results of risk analysis may be questioned, which is the purpose of this
article. Allision risk assessments are typically performed as part of a much larger
quantitative risk analysis (QRA), and challenging the status quo of how such assess-
ments are being performed is an important task, as stated by Goerlandt et al. (2016).
The lack of procedures based on empirical evidence may also result in too much
subjectivity in risk assessments, making replication of results difficult, even when
based on the same input data (Goerlandt and Kujala 2014).
The Merriam-Webster dictionary (n.d.) defines an allision as Bthe running of one
ship upon another ship that is stationary - distinguished from collision^. An allision in
this context is an impact between a ship and a fixed manmade object, such as offshore
surface installations. The Norwegian Petroleum Safety Authority (PSA) has claimed
that the estimated risk of allision from passing vessels is believed to be too conserva-
tive, and this may be due to overestimation caused by not accounting for changes in the
traffic pattern once a new installation is put on location. Estimating the risk posed by
passing vessels is typically done using the COLLIDE risk model (Haugen 1998).
A new Bayesian allision risk model is under development. Some of the most
important parameters with regard to allision risk are the expected passing distance
and the behaviour of ships passing nearby an installation. The new allision risk model is
based on the existing industry standard allision tool BCOLLIDE^ (Haugen et al. 1994;
Haugen and Vollen 1989). It takes into account the effect of new knowledge, technol-
ogy and equipment that have become standard onboard vessels and installations during
the last decade, in order to address some of the shortcomings of the existing COLLIDE
model (Hassel et al. 2014). The application of Bayesian Belief Networks (BBNs) in the
context of maritime traffic and maritime risk assessment has become increasingly
popular in recent years, and the methodology is well suited for the maritime domain
(Hänninen 2014).
The claim that the presence of offshore petroleum installations has an effect on the
traffic pattern and location of shipping lanes has been accepted since the very first
allision risk models, by Haugen and Vollen (1989) and Spouge (1991). Nevertheless, it
has not been studied sufficiently, nor verified empirically. To the best of our knowledge,
the only available empirical study based on AIS data is a Master’s thesis by Skarestad
(2010), which investigated if there were any significant changes to traffic patterns
around temporary drilling installations, by comparing AIS data from reference periods
before and after the temporary installations were on location. The study looked at all
vessels passing within 12 nm (nautical miles, 1 nm = 1852 m) of the installations and
found that there was no significant change to the relative traffic volume inside a 3-nm
passing distance. The study mentions that the 3-nm passing distance may be too great a
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distance to observe any significant changes and states that a quick test of 1 nm
produced more promising results, without going into further detail.
Allision risk from visiting vessels is the topic of several other research and industry
actors (Gibson 2015; IOGP 2010; Sandhåland et al. 2015; Tvedt 2014) and, most
recently, a joint industry project (JIP) with participants DNV GL, Lloyds, Safetec
Nordic, Statoil and ConocoPhillips. The most comparable research to risk assessments
of this kind is that of ship impacts with offshore wind energy installations (Dai et al.
2013) or bridge pylons (Hansen et al. 2013). The structural aspect of allision scenarios
has been studied in detail by several researchers (Amdahl and Johansen 2001; Amdahl
et al. 2012; Storheim and Amdahl 2014; Zhang et al. 2015) and is not addressed in this
study.
Comparative studies using AIS data for other aspects of vessel traffic patterns, such
as the risk of ship-bridge impacts in narrow inland waterways, have also been con-
ducted. Xiao et al. (2015) compared traffic patterns from a narrow Dutch waterway
with a wide Chinese waterway, using AIS. Ship-bridge impacts have many similarities
to ship-offshore installation impacts, and risk model methodology for both cases shares
many elements, as shown by Hansen et al. (2013). However, navigation in open waters
is very different from navigation in inland waterways and confined waters (Kujala et al.
2009; Montewka et al. 2014; Montewka et al. 2012).
Allision risk assessments dealing with open water navigation must investigate traffic
spread across a much larger area and has the added challenge of dealing with larger
angles of course deviations, as described by Wolfram and Naegeli (2004). Povel et al.
(2010) has used AIS data to investigate the allision risk for offshore wind energy
installations but focused on drifting vessels and simply used reference data from Fujii
and Mizuki (1998) to determine the probability of powered passing vessels being on a
collision course. For inland waterway navigation, one may claim that all vessels are to a
certain degree on a Bcollision course^ as they have very small margins when passing
under bridges with multiple pylons crossing the waterway. Still, Proske and Curbach
(2005) found that the average probability of a bridge (pylon) in their study being hit by
a ship was 2.11E−05 per ship passing. This means that navigators are generally good at
avoiding obstacles, new and old, as could be expected.
Over the last half decennium, the petroleum exploration on the NCS has accumu-
lated over a couple of thousand installation years, but only two recorded incidents have
been recorded of impacts between Norwegian installations and non-field-related vessels
(Vinnem 2014). The first incident was in 1988, when a submerged submarine allided
with the steel jacket of the Oseberg B platform, about 140 km west of Bergen. The
other incident was when a small cargo ship allided in a Bglancing blow^ after coming
head on towards the Norwegian-operated Norpipe H7 steel jacket platform on the
German Continental Shelf in 1995, as seen in Fig. 1. In both cases, no lives were lost
and the damage was limited, but both allisions could just as easily have caused major
accidents, if the point of impact had been nearby risers or other critical elements
(Vinnem 2014). Worldwide, several allisions with non-field-related vessels have been
reported (Gibson 2015; IOGP 2010), and there have been more than ten incidents on
the UK Continental Shelf (UKCS) alone, where several came close to causing major
accidents (Okstad and Håbrekke 2008).
The main objective of this article is to investigate changes to the traffic pattern of
merchant vessels passing offshore oil and gas installations on the NCS. The article
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presents an empirical study of one of the most important variables used to calculate the
risk of allision from passing vessels, namely passing distance to the offshore installa-
tion. The results of the study show that merchant vessels alter course to achieve a safe
passing distance to new surface offshore petroleum installations, which means that the
current use of AIS data in allision risk assessments is overly conservative.
For the purpose of illustrating the effect of this parameter, the most recent new
petroleum production installations in the Norwegian sector have been selected. Since
2010, seven new petroleum production installations have been located on the NCS:
Gjøa (semi-submersible), Goliat (Sevan Stabilized Platform (SSP)), Edvard Grieg
(fixed installation—jacket), Gudrun (fixed installation—jacket), Knarr (Floating Pro-
duction, Storage and Offloading (FPSO)), Skarv (FPSO) and Valemon (fixed installa-
tion—jacket), as seen in Fig. 2. Five of these are in the North Sea, and Goliat is in the
Barents Sea, with significant traffic volumes, whereas Skarv in the Norwegian Sea has
much lower traffic volumes along with Knarr in the northern part of the North Sea. The
traffic patterns around these seven installations are studied in this article, before and
after the actual installations were introduced on location. Field-related vessels and
offshore installation support vessels are not part of the scope of work for this article.
Section 1 provides the background for the research, while Sect. 2 describes the data
processing and general methodology. Section 3 analyses the findings and results.
Section 4 contains the discussion, while the conclusion is found in Sect. 5.
2 Methodology
2.1 Allision risk assessment
An allision risk assessment begins with the collection, processing and interpretation of
AIS data. A chaotic mesh of interwoven lines (AIS tracks), as can be seen on the left
side in Fig. 3, are systematically processed to identify shipping lanes and routes in a 10-
nm radius around a given position, as seen on the right side in Fig. 3. The main goal of
the processing is to identify the number of ships in each route, the direction and passing
distance of each route and the standard deviation of each route. These attributes,
together with ship information, provide the basis for further calculations, by, for
example, COLLIDE. Since multiple parameters influence the results, it can be hard
Fig. 1 Photo of the MS Reint-H7 allision, taken by the crew on the nearby standby vessel
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to state categorically that one or the other is most important, but allision risk models are
highly sensitive to the passing distance and the probability of a vessel being on a
collision course. This is not surprising, as the act of striking an object requires close
proximity and a collision course, so obviously, the passing distance between a ship and
an installation is a crucial factor.
Fig. 2 Map of the seven petroleum production installations installed on the NCS between 2010 and 2015
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2.2 Data collection
AIS data for the seven locations have been collected using the Christian Michelsen
Research (CMR) online portal,1 which provides access to AIS data from the Norwegian
Coastal Administration (NCA). The older datasets have been collected from archived
Vissim2 data, provided by Safetec Nordic, as the CMR portal only has AIS data going
back 2 years. The AIS data for the traffic patterns after the installations were commis-
sioned on location are from April 2015 to April 2016, while data from before the
installations were introduced are from May 2009 to May 2010 for the Gjøa installation,
which was put on location in June 2010 and from June 2010 to June 2011 for the other
installations. This has been done to ensure 12 months of data for both the Bbefore^ and
Bafter^ scenarios. Using AIS data from several years before most installations are
placed on location is beneficial, since fixed installations in particular are introduced
on location in steps, with the jacket being installed well in advance of the topside
module.
For Gjøa, the before dataset is from immediately before the installation came on
location, while the after dataset is from several years after. For Goliat, the situation is
opposite, with the before dataset being from several years ahead of the installation
coming on location, while the after dataset being from immediately afterwards. This
should not matter significantly, as any tracks related to the installation or field-related
traffic are removed during the processing and filtering. However, it may be argued that
a dataset shortly after an installation is introduced may not see the same level of
changes to the traffic pattern, as the traffic has not had much time to adjust. This would
only mean that any findings of significant change are conservative, as one could expect
a more significant change as more time passes. For datasets from immediately before an
installation is introduced, one may claim that significant field-related work and vessel
activity could trigger a change in traffic pattern even before the installation has arrived,
but this would again only mean that any observations would be less significant, making
Fig. 3 Left: unprocessed AIS data for 12 months. Right: result of traffic study, showing routes
1 http://aisnorge.aisonline.com/stat/
2 http://vissim.no/products/vessel-traffic-management
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the results from this study conservative. One may expect more field-related activity, and
for a longer period for fixed installations, than floating installations, but some prepa-
ratory activity would be required in any case.
A lot of field-related traffic is common in the months before an installation is
installed, and this may influence the traffic pattern on the location. Thus, using an
Bold^ dataset is preferable, to capture the Breal^ traffic pattern, undisturbed by field-
related activity of any kind. This issue is less problematic for floating installations and
either way something that is taken care of, by processing and filtering, which will be
described in more detail later.
The datasets have been limited to a radius of 4 nm around the installations as the
study predominantly aims to investigate how the traffic pattern changes within a radius
of 1–2 nm from the installations. To properly compare the traffic patterns, however, it is
also necessary to see at what distance the traffic remains unchanged. Hence, a distance
of 4 nm was deemed appropriate. Incidentally, experience from allision risk assess-
ments has shown that vessel traffic passing at a distance greater than 4 nm usually has a
negligible risk contribution (Kleiven 2016).
There is a guard zone (GZ) of 500 m (meters) around each installation, where no
vessel is allowed to enter without specific permission. The area of particular interest is
therefore just outside this guard zone, as it is expected that no traffic inside the guard
zone would be found. According to the head of the Statoil Operations Centre, Grethe
Strøm (2015), the individual offshore installation manager (OIM) decides if a violation
of the guard zone should be reported to the police for investigation, but according to
Strøm, this is seldom done unless the violation results in some form of unwanted event
or impact.
AIS raw data consist of a long list of data points with a set of attributes, such as
BInternational Maritime Organization (IMO) number^, BMaritime Mobile Service Iden-
tity (MMSI) number^, Bship name^, Bship type^, Bflag state^, Bdate^, Bdestination^, Bto
port^, Bfrom port^, Bnavstatus^ and more. AIS data are often riddled with Bghost
entries^ where most or even all critical data fields are empty or corrupted. CMR/NCA
data typically have a lower ratio of such bad data, than the Vissim data (Kleiven 2016).
To properly process the data in a way that enables comparative analysis, the raw data
files that usually come in some form of comma- or tab-separated file format must be
converted into a file format that can be visually plotted in a geographic information
system (GIS) tool, in this case the software application MapInfo Professional.3
2.3 Filtering of data
The left part of Fig. 4 shows an example of how a typical AIS dataset looks like before
data processing. The red rings in Fig. 4 show a passing distance of 4, 3, 2 and 1 nm and
installation guard zone of 500 m. Field-related activity is clearly shown around an
installation northwest of the location, as a big Bthistle^. Just south-southeast of the
location is another characteristic thistle showing field-related activity. In order to focus
on unrelated shipping traffic passing through the area of concern, all field-related
activity and other irregular vessel traffic are filtered away, as shown on the right part
of Fig. 4. Such thistles may, however, cause a certain degree of shielding, as field-
3 http://www.pitneybowes.com/us/location-intelligence/geographic-information-systems/mapinfo-pro.html
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related vessels hover around an area before the installation has come to the location.
Such activity may have a shielding effect causing less passing vessels to transit through
the thistle before the installation has arrived. A shielding effect in the before data would
make the results slightly more conservative. Most of the after data contain some degree
of a thistle around the new installations, as many installations have some field-related
activity close by. This may influence the results by enhancing the repulsive effect on
passing traffic, arguably making the results less conservative. Investigating if field-
related activity close by an installation enhances the effect of ships increasing their
passing distance could be studied in further work, but at this point, it is of less
importance, as we must first determine if there is a significant change in traffic patterns
at all.
The original datasets for each of the seven locations have been processed to filter out
all tracks outside the scope of this study and are thus categorized as Bnoise^. This
includes all tracks with any form of identifiers in the data, such as destination, to port or
from port being equal to the installation in question, or Bship type^ being Bdrillship^ or
Bseismic vessel^, indicating that it is field-related traffic going to or from the installa-
tion in question or operating in the vicinity around an installation (field-related traffic to
neighbouring installations has not been filtered away, as long as the supply vessels and
similar offshore support vessels passing by the location in question are behaving as
normal passing vessels within 4 nm of the installation in question, meaning that their
tracks are predominantly straight lines within the 4-nm radius).
Straight tracklines are obviously good candidates for a comparative analysis, as the
traffic is clearly passing through the area. However, some tracks have course changes
that are significant, without any indication or information in the data that can explain
why. Such tracks cannot be filtered away unless there is some clear indication of why
the course was changed. Tracks with course changes of less than 90° have thus not been
excluded from the dataset simply due to the course change. If the course changes are
frequent and/or in excess of 90°, it may be possible to exclude the tracks without any
explicit information in the data to explain the erratic behaviour. A visual inspection of
the tracks can sometimes be sufficient to categorize a track as Bpassing traffic^ or not.
Some tracks that are not perfectly straight will always remain though, as seen in the
right half of Fig. 5.
In addition to data that have some sort of identifier indicating field relation, it is
possible to visually identify offshore-related vessels by considering the tracklines. If
Fig. 4 Example of irregular tracks (left) that have been filtered away (right) (north is up)
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data rows are missing key information, this makes it possible to filter away vessel
traffic that is behaving in a very Bnon-merchant vessel^ manner. An example of this is
shown in Fig. 5, where the left image has several tracks that have tracklines with turns
in excess of 90° and even 180° turns. After filtering away traffic with field-related
behaviour, we are left with the right image, with predominantly straight lines,
representing Bnormal^ vessel traffic passing the location.
2.4 Analytical tools
The CMR online portal4, which is the web interface for the NCA’s AIS database, is only
accessible to government agencies, but access may be granted to third parties based on
legitimate needs, see Fig. 6 (Åsheim 2015). This typically means actors who cooperate
with public services to provide maritime traffic surveillance, oil spill prevention or
traffic risk assessments. The online portal enables users to extract AIS data from the last
2 years, based on a range of possible parameters. The data excerpt is saved as a tab-
separated file, which is subsequently used in geographic information system (GIS)
software, in this case MapInfo, to visualize and process the data. The older datasets
from archived Vissim5 data, provided by Safetec Nordic, had already been adapted for
use in MapInfo.
In the study presented in this article, the data were manually processed in MapInfo,
using the built-in Structured Query Language (SQL) functionality in the software,
along with manual and visual inspection of the data tables and graphical representation
of the data. Obtaining the results and numbers for each installation and distance/area
was done using SQL queries. Further details on how this was done are presented in the
following section.
3 Analysis and results
3.1 Ship traffic data
Processing and filtering of both datasets (before and after) for each location provide us
with an overview of all locations and distances before and after installations were
introduced on location, as shown in Table 1. The installations are anonymized in
Fig. 5 Detailed example of irregular tracks (left) that have been filtered away (right)
4 http://aisnorge.aisonline.com/stat/
5 http://vissim.no/products/vessel-traffic-management
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Table 1, as access to the NCA’s AIS database requires that no single unit can be
identifiable in published research.
Table 2 shows the average number of passings for each distance category for all
installations.
Table 3 shows the total number of passings for each distance category for all
installations.
Table 3 shows that the most recent AIS datasets are almost twice as large as the older
sets. An increase in the general ship traffic activity could account for some of this
increase, but not all. It is more likely that the majority of the increase is due to the
different nature of the two data sources. The CMR data are more comprehensive and
from a larger set of AIS receivers and generally hold a higher standard of data quality.
Additionally, the Vissim dataset is a massive dataset for the entire Norwegian coast,
meaning that many tracks are continuous for long stretches and time periods, counting
as a single passing/data entry even if a vessel goes back and forth between two
destinations. The CMR online portal lets users collect data for a restricted area; in this
Fig. 6 Screen capture of CMR AIS server web interface
Table 1 Number of ships passing installation at various distances
Installation <GZ GZ–1 nm 1–2 nm 2–3 nm 3–4 nm Total
A Before 3 17 42 72 103 237
After 0 5 48 166 358 577
B Before 12 53 135 236 388 824
After 0 19 123 364 607 1113
C Before 55 142 253 380 546 1376
After 0 64 552 947 1379 2942
D Before 19 100 293 561 1002 1975
After 0 46 266 718 3535 4565
E Before 43 162 302 447 607 1561
After 0 24 290 681 1621 2616
F Before 0 4 45 115 107 271
After 0 1 34 47 62 144
G Before 2 17 39 55 84 197
After 0 19 85 150 209 463
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case, a circular area with a radius of 4 nm around each location has been used. AIS
tracks going in or out of this circle are cut, as seen in Fig. 7, and thus count as separate
passings/data entries, potentially making the dataset artificially larger/more numerous.
3.2 Normalized results
Since the two datasets (before/after) have a different total number of passings, normal-
izing the data helps to better understand the results. Table 4 shows the average
normalized number of passings for each distance category, while Fig. 8 is a visual
representation of the same data.
The results show a significant decrease in traffic within 1 nm of an installation, once
it is placed on location. Between 1 and 3 nm, there is also a decrease, while traffic
outside 3-nm distance seems to be unaffected.
The total number of ships passing the seven locations in the study (after phase) is
over 12,000, and not a single passing was observed within the guard zone once an
installation is introduced, where there had been a total of 134 passings across the
sample space previously (as shown in Table 3). Ships passing at a distance of less than
1 nm, but outside the guard zone, were more than halved, from almost 500 initially
(7.7%) to less than 200 (1.4%) after the introduction of the installations (as shown in
Table 4).
Looking more closely at vessels passing within 2000 m of the installations, the
change in traffic pattern becomes even more evident. Table 5 shows the normalized
average values distributed across segments of 500-m increments. The results are also
presented in Fig. 9, which shows that traffic clearly shifts and seeks away from the
installations.
3.3 Variance amongst the installations
Looking at the variation across the seven installations in our study, as shown in Fig. 10,
we see that all traffic passing within 500 m (GZ) stops once an installation arrives on
location. Traffic passing outside the GZ but within 1000 m also declines significantly,
with the biggest change for installation D, which goes from 31.0 to 0%, and at the other
end of the spectrum, we find installation B, which goes from 18.0 to 6.5% traffic within
this segment. Some of the explanation for the significant change at installation D may
Table 2 Average number of ships (across all locations) passing installation at various distances
<GZ GZ–1 nm 1–2 nm 2–3 nm 3–4 nm Total
Average Before 19 71 158 267 405 920
After 0 25 200 439 1110 1774
Table 3 Total number of ships (across all locations) passing installation at various distances
<GZ GZ–1 nm 1–2 nm 2–3 nm 3–4 nm Total
Total Before 134 495 1109 1866 2837 6441
After 0 178 1398 3073 7771 12,420
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be due to additional measures implemented at this location, specifically designed to
divert traffic away from the installation. However, the overall reduction is quite
significant for all installations, and even the Bworst^ amongst them (installation B)
has its traffic in this segment more than halved. In the third distance segment (1000–
1500 m), the variance has two outliers, while the rest is fairly consistent. Installation A
actually doubles its traffic in this segment, going from 30.4 to 60.0%, while installation
F, on the other hand, goes from 20.0% traffic to 0. Installation A is located in an area
with very few other offshore installations, and the geographical location together and a
traffic composition with less variations with regard to vessel type and flag may explain
why traffic around this installation is behaving somewhat differently compared to the
other installations. Installation F had only five passings inside 2000 m in the before
dataset and only one passing in the after dataset, which explains why the variance for
this installation is so different. For the last segment (1500–2000 m), the number of
passings for installation F actually went from 4 to 1, but the normalized results show an
increase from 80% of traffic to 100% of traffic in this segment, due to the miniscule
dataset. The biggest variance came from installation D, which is not surprising, since it
had the biggest decrease in the second segment. Similarly, installation A had the lowest
variance, as it had most of its change in the third segment. Overall, the changes in
traffic in this segment were fairly consistent. Even though traffic reduction is observed
in the 1–3-nm range too, the effect is most pronounced inside a 1-nm range.
3.4 Changes to traffic pattern
The results of this study show that traffic that naturally has a passing distance greater
than 1 nm (1852 m) will mostly repeat its tracks and pay no heed to new obstacles that
Fig. 7 AIS data of vessel traffic pattern, before (left) and after (right) introduction of installation on location
Table 4 Normalized average number of ships (across all locations) passing installation at various distances
<GZ (%) GZ–1 nm (%) 1–2 nm (%) 2–3 nm
(%)
3–4 nm (%) Total (%)
Average (normalized) Before 2.1 7.7 17 29 44 100
After 0.0 1.4 11 25 63 100
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appear 1 nm or more away from their course. However, traffic that suddenly finds a
new obstacle within 1 nm of their intended track will alter course in order to achieve a
passing distance close to 1 nm. The results in Fig. 10 could be interpreted such that
these deviations vary considerably depending on local conditions around these instal-
lations and possibly aspects of the dominating traffic in the lanes around these
installations, factors that are unknown unless an extensive effort could be invested to
interview all relevant crews on these vessels regarding their manoeuvring around
installations. One could perhaps expect to see differences in navigational behaviour
around installations with heavier traffic density compared to those with lesser traffic
density, but no such observations could be found in the data. Although there are
differences between the installations, it is not possible to draw any conclusions based
on traffic density. Other factors such as proximity to ports or special geographical areas
could perhaps also have an effect on the navigational behaviour, but such things would
have to be investigated in future research.
A quick regression analysis of the data in Table 5 shows that both exponential,
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Fig. 8 Normalized results across all installations, before and after commissioning
Table 5 Normalized average number of ships (across all locations) passing installation at distances inside
2000 m
<GZ (%) GZ - 1000 m (%) 1000–1500 m (%) 1500–2000 m (%)
Average (normalized) Before 10.7 21.7 29.2 38.4
After 0.0 2.2 20.6 77.3
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Fig. 10 Normalized results for all seven installations, before and after commissioning, inside 2000 m
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difference between the different types found in the third decimal. The polynomial
regression had the best fit within the dataset, which is shown in Fig. 11 but does not
extended well beyond the dataset. The power and exponential regressions fit better
outside the dataset, with a more consistent shape of the regression line. A more detailed
regression analysis of a wider dataset could determine if a power or exponential
function would fit best, but this has not been performed in this study.
4 Discussion
4.1 Data basis and applicability
This study has investigated all the production installations introduced on the NCS since
2010, amounting to seven new installations. The sample size may not be very large, but it
is not feasible to extend the timeframe backwards, as archived AIS data from that far back
are not readily available, and the timeframe already extends to the present day, making a
larger timeframe very difficult. The geographical diversity of the sample size is deemed
satisfactory, as it spans several key shipping lanes, seas and areas with different traffic
volume and pattern. The distance between the installation furthest north and the installa-
tion furthest south is over 1000 nm, equivalent of the entire western seaboard of the USA.
It has been shown in Sect. 2.2 that the time periods vary considerably with respect to
how long before and after installations that the datasets have been obtained. It was
further shown in Sect. 2.2 that the effect of these differences would most likely be that
the results of the analysis would be conservative.
The difference in the number of vessel passings does not invalidate the comparative
study, because this can easily be solved by normalizing the results. Even if the
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Fig. 11 Regression of normalized results across all installations, after introduction on location, inside 2000 m
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variation in the total number of vessels/tracks/data entries. Any form of error, such as
continuous tracks or cut tracks, should affect the data equally across the entire area, yet
the presented results are clear. The sample of seven installations is spread across 5 years
and with a significant geographical spread and a large variation in traffic density (from
about 200 tracks to almost 4500, as seen in Table 1).
Seven installations are relatively few as a sample size, but there are no more
installations available where AIS data may be established before and after installation.
There are, as noted previously in Sect. 3.3, distinct variations between the extent to
which the lanes deviate around an installation, depending on a lot of local factors and
traffic aspects for each of the lanes around these installations. The average values
established in the study should, on the other hand, be relatively representative.
The Norwegian Sea and North Sea have shipping lanes with levels of traffic
that are highly comparable to busy waterways in other parts of Europe, so the
majority of installations in the sample size are exposed to high levels of shipping
traffic. Overall, the installations in this study have a good diversity regarding
when they were introduced, installation type, geographical location, traffic expo-
sure and other relevant attributes. The sample size could be increased by
including installations on the neighbouring UKCS if access to (especially histor-
ical) UK AIS data had been possible, but we do not believe that the results
would be different if additional installations from the UKCS had been included
in the study. A way to improve the quality of the study would be to have access
to AIS data from the same source for the before and after periods, but this would
require long-term planning, exceeding the scope of this study. Using data from
temporary exploration drilling installations, as done by Skarestad (2010), could
increase the sample size of number of installations, as there has been on average
about 50 exploration drilling operations each year since 2010 (NPD 2016).
However, such operations are typically not very well documented and informa-
tion about exact location and timeframe for the operations may be difficult to
obtain on a large scale. These operations typically last about 3 months each, so it
would be necessary to compare AIS data from an equivalent period before
operations, with data from when these operations were ongoing, as opposed to
before and after for the permanent installations studied in this article. If sufficient
information about exact location and time periods could be obtained for a large
set of exploration drilling operations, it could be interesting to see if the results
from this study could be replicated with the temporary installations. However,
mixing temporary and permanent installations in a joint dataset could be con-
sidered for future work.
It could be argued that all of the ships recorded in the present study are behaving
responsibly; none of them pass inside the guard zone. These ships will never collide
with an installation, at least as long as their navigational and propulsion equipment is
intact. Those ships that pose a real threat are those that behave irresponsibly. There are
anecdotal stories about ships that pass right through fields with several installations,
sometimes fearsomely close to installations, without responding to radio calls and
without performing evasive course actions. These are the real threats but may not be
captured by statistics from ships behaving responsibly. But this is a generic complicat-
ing factor for all use of statistics in order to capture operational performance. It cannot
be eliminated and therefore has to be kept in mind when making conclusions.
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4.2 Comparison with other relevant studies
This study has demonstrated that shipping traffic adjust their sailing track when new
offshore petroleum installations are commissioned, by generally altering course to
achieve a passing distance of at least 1 nm. The results clearly show how the traffic
moves away from the installations to achieve a passing distance of 1–3 nm.
The study by Skarestad (2010) did not find any clear indications that the number of
vessels passing within 3 nm of the two installations in the study decreased and states
that a passing distance of about 1 nm seems to be a natural passing distance. The study
was limited to two temporary installations, only on location for 100 and 85 days and
with reference periods before and after of 100 days.
Although the results by Skarestad are valuable, we consider that the aspects indi-
cated previously can explain the apparent conflicting results; hence, there is no real
conflict between the results presented here and by Skarestad (2010). Having a long
timeframe for allision research is an important factor, as allisions (with non-field-related
vessels) do not happen very often.
4.3 Use of the data and impact on the results of allision risk studies
Current allision risk assessments use AIS data Bas is^ when performing traffic studies
that serve as input to risk assessment calculations. Meaning, they typically collect AIS
data for a 12-month period, before an installation is placed in a location. Similarly to
the data processing done in this study, all Bfield-related^ or Birregular^ traffic is
typically filtered out, but the final traffic picture may have data implying that there is
a shipping lane that intersects or has a passing distance of less than 500 m to the
proposed installation location. Many analysts will blissfully disregard that the traffic
currently passing so close to the intended position of the installation obviously will
have to adjust their sailing track once the installation arrives on location. Hence, many
risk assessments are in reality calculating the risk of allision towards an Binvisible
installation that has been on location for the past 12 months^. Performing risk
assessments while ignoring how the introduction of an installation will affect the
future traffic pattern in an area results in overly conservative risk estimates. While
erring on the side of caution is the hallmark of risk analysis, it is important to
understand the potential consequences of being overly conservative. With increasing
activity in the maritime domain, inefficient use of limited sea space may lead to
potential conflicts in areas that may be overdesigned in terms of navigational safety.
As can be seen in Fig. 12, offshore petroleum installations are not small objects, and
they will obviously have an impact on their surroundings and traffic in the area. This
study has identified and described this effect, and this new knowledge should be
incorporated into current and new allision risk assessment models. Moving a route
with 15 ships in it, from 500- to 1000-m passing distance, reduces the allision
probability from about 1.3E−03 to about 6.5E−04 with a standard deviation of
0.4 nm and to about 8.6E−05 with a standard deviation of 0.2 nm. This could very
well prove to be decisive for the overall risk analysis, as the PSA’s acceptance
criterion is 1.0E−04, and the results are very sensitive to changes in passing distance,
standard deviation (COLLIDE assumes normal distribution for all routes) and number
of ships in a route.
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The old COLLIDE allision risk model may adapt to the findings of this study by
manually processing the initial AIS traffic study that serves as input to COLLIDE
calculations, along the lines of the findings in this study. Manually adjusting the AIS
data in such a manner has already been done occasionally, though only as an attempt to
predict traffic patterns several years into the future and based solely on expert judge-
ment. This study has shown empirically how traffic moves away from a new installa-
tion, if there used to be ships traversing the area. Future risk assessments using
COLLIDE should incorporate these findings by default.
The new Bayesian allision risk model under development by the authors has already
added elements to the model to account for the findings of this study. It will be able to use
AIS data for areaswith existing installations as is or adjust AIS data gathered from a location
before an installation is introduced. Adjustments of AIS data will be made according to the
findings of this study, where traffic is seen to withdraw outwards towards a passing distance
of about 1 nm. This is done by adding a node (BAIS data gathered while installation is on
location^) to the Bayesian model, with two states, Byes^ and Bno^. This node will then
subsequently influence other nodes, such as Bpassing distance^ and Bprobability of being on
a collision course^. One of the strengths of the new risk model and using a Bayesian
network as opposed to fault trees used in COLLIDE is better ability and flexibility to
incorporate new knowledge and research such as the findings from this study.
4.4 Influencing factors and historical development
The original COLLIDE model calculated that a certain percentage of ships passing in
the vicinity of offshore installations would in fact be drawn towards them, as they used
the installations as waypoints or to confirm their position (Haugen et al. 1994), as
navigation aids at the time were of a very different quality than that of today. In addition
to the natural evolution of navigation, Statoil established a vessel surveillance centre in
1997 (Statoil Marin, now called Statoil Operations Centre), tasked with monitoring all
ship activity near Statoil’s installations and hailing any vessels on a potential collision
course (PSA 2012). Over time, mariners have learned that heading towards an instal-
lation will result in calls from Statoil Operations Centre (or an equivalent third party
responsible for traffic surveillance), asking them to divert their course away from the
installation. This type of traffic surveillance and hailing has proved very effective as a
Fig. 12 The Goliat platform (photo by Eni6)
6 http://www.wsj.com/articles/italys-eni-set-to-begin-arctic-oil-quest-even-as-others-abandon-field-
1448274602
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precautionary measure, as registered incidents with vessels on a potential collision
course have been in general decline over the last decade. In 2004, 43 incidents of
vessels on potential collision course were registered, while in 2014, only a single
incident was registered (PSA 2014). This barrier could be a contributing factor to the
repulsive effect that offshore installations seem to have on traffic patterns on the NCS.
4.5 Future research
While the Statoil Operations Centre has had a quantifiable effect on traffic patterns on
the NCS, it would be interesting to investigate if other risk control options would have a
similar effect. There are no Traffic Separation Schemes (TSS) in close proximity to
offshore petroleum installations on the NCS, but investigating what effect a TSS, VTS
(for merchant traffic) or Notice to Mariners would have on navigational behaviour
would be an interesting topic for future research. Additional research to investigate the
validity of the results from this paper for other areas, outside the NCS, should also be
considered for future research. It would also be interesting to investigate similarities in
navigational behaviour in countries without shore-based monitoring services, such as
the Statoil Operations Centre. Would we find navigational behaviour similar to that on
the NCS prior to the implementation of the Statoil Operations Centre?
The variations in the results between the different installations in this study should
also be investigated further, to establish how local factors such as proximity to busy
ports and traffic density influence the traffic patterns and navigational behaviour.
Installation size, type and design may also influence local traffic, so a more detailed
case study of individual installations or areas could be performed, to try to identify
relevant factors influencing navigational behaviour more specifically.
5 Conclusion
This article compares the vessel traffic patterns for seven installations on the NCS, compar-
ing the vessel installation passing distance found inAIS data before and after the installations
were placed in their locations. The study shows that the current methodology of calculating
allision risk with AIS data as is leads to overly conservative estimates of allision risk. Vessel
traffic will adjust their sailing tracks when a new offshore oil and gas installation are
commissioned, by generally altering course to achieve a passing distance of at least 1 nm.
The research clearly shows how the traffic moves away from the installations to achieve a
passing distance of 1–3 nm. At the same time, there is a small, but not insignificant, volume
(1.43%) of ships inside 1-nm radius, but outside the guard zone of 500 m.
Inside a 2000-m radius, the results are even more apparent, with a reduction from 21.7
to 2.2% at a distance of 500 m (GZ) to 1000 m. These results indicate that an allision risk
model could, for example, assume an exponential or power distribution of the probability
that a vessel would increase its passing distance, based on initial AIS data. As it can be
assumed that vessels seek outwards on all sides of an installation, it would be an
axisymmetric distribution. As demonstrated by Rawson and Rogers (2015), the entire
lane does not necessarily move away, but rather, the vessels closest to an installation move
towards the outer perimeter of the lane, while the ships already there remain, thus
Bcompressing^ the lane towards the outer boundary rather than moving uniformly. This
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effect has been observed in our research also, as proximity to an installation is the strongest
indicator of how much ships will move away. This behaviour may increase ship-ship
collision risk, but in our case of open water navigation, there is always ample space on
either side of shipping lanes for evasive manoeuvres. For other areas, where space is
restricted, or traffic density is very high, ships might be less likely to perform corrective
deviations away from an installation, as they may have nowhere to manoeuvre. This
means that normalization in such cases may not accurately reflect navigational behaviour
if one is comparing low-traffic-density installations to high-traffic-density installations.
This study has not observed traffic within 500 m (GZ) for any of the installations in
the after scenario. This could be expected, as active barriers such as traffic surveillance
and hailing are common for most installations. The results, however, also show that
traffic with a passing distance of less than 1 nm is reduced significantly as traffic seeks
away from new installations. Supported by the empirical documentation in this study,
future allision risk assessments should incorporate the reduction in vessel traffic within
a 1-nm passing distance, when using historical AIS data as basis for the calculations.
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